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Abstract
All micro studies of demand are based on using time series cross sectional data. Because in such
data each household is only observed once, it is only under strong identifying restrictions that one can
interpret the coeﬃcients on consumer behavior. For example, if tastes are correlated with income,
the usual estimates of income elasticities from cross sectional data are biased. In contrast, panel
data allows identiﬁcation of the coeﬃcients on consumer behavior in the presence of unobservable
correlated heterogeneity. In this paper we make use of a unique Spanish panel data set on household
expenditures to test whether unobservable heterogeneity in household demands (taste) is correlated
with total expenditures (income). We ﬁnd that tastes are indeed correlated with income for half of
the goods considered.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The usual way of estimating demand systems is to use cross sectional household level data on expenditures.
Because data is cross sectional, each household is observed only once. This means that the inﬂuence of
diﬀerences in income, demographic composition, and prices faced (that is, observables) can be modeled,
but that it is only under extremely restrictive (and not well-studied) assumptions it is possible to model the
eﬀect of unobservable diﬀerences between households in their tastes or propensities to spend in particular
ways. Therefore demand system estimation usually assumes that all consumers have identical preferences.
Now, if this is not the case and consumers do have diﬀerent preferences (which is widely believed to be
the case), we will still get unbiased estimates of income repsonses if this preference heterogeneity is
random in nature, that is, if it does not vary with income in any systematic way. But if this assumption
is not met and so preferences are correlated with income, then estimates of income responses will be
biased (because diﬀerences in income will be confounded by diﬀerences in tastes). This issue is of great
importance because the magnitudes of income responses are important inputs into many policy analyses.
For example, the distributional impact of tax reforms (the extent to which tax changes diﬀerentially
impact rich and poor households) depends on the way spending patterns vary by income levels.
In contrast to the usual way of estimating demand systems, this paper uses a unique panel data set,
the Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares (hereafter the ECPF) on household expenditures. The
ECPF is a rotating panel data set covering the period 1985-97 with households staying in the survey for
between 5 and 8 quaters. It has information on a wide range of goods, information on several income
categories as well as information on demographic variables. Because each household is observed multiple
times, we can allow for time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity in demands. We estimate a demand
system for a full range of non-durable consumption goods and test whether unobservable heterogeneity
(tastes) is with total expenditure (income). We ﬁnd that total expenditure and tastes are correlated for
almost half of the goods considered.
Panel data on household expenditures for a full range of commodities is scarce, and as a consequence,
only a few other studies have considered the question of correlation between preferences and incomes.
Aasness, Biørn and Skjerpen (1993) estimate a Linear Expenditure System on a Norwegian panel of
length two years with yearly information. They ﬁnd that preferences are correlated with income. How-
ever, their study has some limitations. Firstly, they only have two observations per household, where
we have between ﬁve and eight observations per household. Secondly, they use the Linear Expenditure
System, which has some unfortunate functional form implications. One implication of the Linear Ex-
penditure System is that all goods must be substitutes (if the system is to be integrable, which they
impose). Another, and more important implication for the research question under consideration is that
imposing linear Engel curves if data is in fact not linear may be problematic when testing for correlated
heterogeneity. To see this, suppose that data is really quadratic. Fitting a linear speciﬁcation to this data
while allowing for diﬀerent intercepts for diﬀerent households may then imply that the household-speciﬁc
intercepts seem to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent when in fact it is the misspeciﬁcation that forces them to
be diﬀerent. We will return to this point in the model section. Duncan, Gardes, Gaubert and Strarzec
(2002) also examine possible biases in budget elasticities arising from not taking account of correlated
2heterogeneity, using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (the PSID) and a Polish panel data survey.
They also ﬁnd evidence of bias caused by correlated heterogeneity. However, their study is limited in
that their data only has expenditure information on food eaten at home and food eaten outside home.
In contrast, the ECPF has expenditure information on a wide range of goods. Carrasco, Labeaga and
Lopez-Salido (2004) use the ECPF to test for the presence of habit formation, employing a test proposed
in Meghir and Weber (1996). They model preferences as ﬂexible direct translog preferences allowing for
time non-separabilities and preference shocks. They ﬁnd that it is important to control for correlated
heterogeneity (“ﬁxed eﬀects”) and doing that they ﬁnd evidence of habit formation in all three goods.
However, they do not consider a full demand system, but only the three goods, Food at home, Transport
and Services 1. Labeaga and Puig (2002) also use the ECPF and ﬁnd evidence of correlated heterogene-
ity. They also emphasize the linear model and consider a diﬀerent sample than we do. Another paper
that is closely related to ours is Browning and Collado (2004). They take as starting point our ﬁnding of
correlated heterogeneity and ask whether there in addition to this correlated heterogneity also is evidence
of habit formation. Their answer is aﬃrmative. Finally, Calvet and Comon (2003) test for correlated
heterogeneity, using the Family Expenditure Survey (the FES). The FES is a cross sectional data set and
thus Calvet and Comon (2003) are forced to employ a restrictive speciﬁcation of unobservable hetero-
geneity in order to be able to identify their model. Firstly, they need that budget shares are linear in the
expenditure term, and secondly, they can only allow for a one-dimensional heterogeneity term, which is
a product of a one-dimensional household-speciﬁc term and a one-dimensional commodity-speciﬁct e r m .
In other words: Heterogeneity across consumers is modelled by a single parameter for each consumer.
With panel data it is possible to allow for heterogeneity terms that are both household - and commodity-
speciﬁc, thus allowing for heterogeneity across consumers to be modelled by an N-dimensional parameter,
where N is the number of goods. The empirical results of Calvet and Comon (2003) are stunning: They
conclude that basically all the variation in budget shares is due to correlated heterogeneity, i.e. that
income and tastes are completely confounded. This means that there is no income eﬀect, so changes in
household income have no impact on budget shares. In this paper, we also test if there is an income eﬀect.
Our ﬁndings contradict those of Calvet and Comon (2003) in that, even though we also ﬁnd evidence of
correlated heterogeneity, we still ﬁnd evidence of signiﬁcant income eﬀects for the vast majority of the
commodities considered.
In order to illustrate the issue of income eﬀect versus correlated heterogeneity more clearly, consider
the following ﬁgure:
1They choose these three goods only in order to be able to compare their ﬁndings with those of Meghir and Weber



















If all the variation in budget shares we see in the data is due to heterogeneity and there is no impact of
income on budget shares, it means that consumers have diﬀerent homothethic preferences 2.I nt h i sc a s e ,
income and tastes are completely confounded and what we would usually attribute to changes in income
when estimating demand systems on cross sectional data should, if this is true, in fact be attributed to
heterogeneity only. This is the top right box in the ﬁgure, and this is the conclusion of Calvet and Comon
(2003). The usual way of formulating and estimating demand systems is represented in the lower left
box of the ﬁgure: Usually, it is assumed that consumers have identical non-homothetic preferences. But
it could also be the case that tastes and income are only partly confounded and there is in fact an eﬀect
from both tastes and income. This is the lower right box of the ﬁgure.
The research question of this paper can thus be formulated in terms of this ﬁgure: Which box is the
correct way to model and estimate demand systems? Is the variation in budget shares caused by an
income eﬀect, by a taste eﬀect or by a combination of the two? That is the question we seek to answer
in this paper.
Another motivation for considering the question of whether total expenditure is correlated with unob-
served heterogeneity can be found in the theoretical literature that deals with nonparametric identiﬁcation
of demand models with preference heterogeneity from repeated cross sections. Every identiﬁcation result
in this literature presupposes that unobservables are independent of observables (see e.g. Roehrig (1988),
Brown and Walker (1989), Brown and Matzkin (1998), Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2003), Matzkin
(2003), Beckert and Blundell (2004)). This paper can thus, aside from the pure applied implications of
bias or no bias in the usual estimates of income responses, also be seen as reaching into the broader
research agenda on "How to formulate preference heterogeneity in demand systems". Obviously, the
issue of whether observables and unobservables are correlated becomes less of a problem when panel data
is available, because with panel data we have possibilities for allowing for such correlation. But panel
data on consumer expenditures is scarce. And moreover, some of the existing cross sectional data sets
on consumer expenditures are of very high quality and ongoingly collected (like for example the FES).
The research question of how to identify consumer demand models with unobservable heterogeneity from




i where the budget shares are given by the ﬁxed coeﬃcients α1,....,αN.
4cross sections is therefore also for this reason an important one.
In this paper, we formulate a demand system as a linearized QUAID system with unobservable
heterogeneity representing diﬀerences in tastes in consumers’ demands. Because we have panel data
available we can let the additive unobservable heterogeneity terms be both commodity - and household-
speciﬁc. Further, we can test whether total expenditure is correlated with tastes by an instrumental
variables approach, because the time series of observations for each household provides us with (potential)
instruments. This means that we are able to identify the income responses in the case of correlated
heterogeneity. We carefully examine validity and relevance of the potential instruments. We carry out the
test for correlated heterogeneity as the regression-based version of a Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity.
We compare the estimated marginal eﬀects when taking account of correlated heterogeneity with the
marginal eﬀects resulting from the usual way of estimating demand systems.
This rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we specify the model. In Section 3 we
describe the sample of the ECPF we use for this paper. Section 4 contains the empirical analysis and
results and Section 5 discusses and concludes.
2 The Model
We will base our model on the linearized version of the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand system (the
QUAID) used in Blundell, Pashardes and Weber (1993). The original QUAID system is the quadratic
extension of the Almost Ideal Demand system (the AID) and was introduced by Banks, Blundell and
Lewbel (1997).
Let i =1 ,...,N index the N commodities, let h =1 ,....,H index households and let t =1 ,...,Th index
time periods for households h.L e twiht denote the budget share for commodity i for household h at time
t,l e txht denote total expenditure for household h at time t and let pit denote the price of commodity i
at time t and let pt denote the vector of all prices at time t. The QUAID system is then given by
wiht = αi +
N X
j=1
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This demand system is integrable, that is, there exists a utility function such that the demand underlying
the budget shares in (1) is given as the maximisation of this utility function subject to a linear budget
5constraint. A feature of the QUAID that has made it very popular is that it allows diﬀerent income







that is, a household with a high level of total expenditure (high x)c a nh a v ead i ﬀerent behavioral response
to a change in its budget than a household with a low level of total expenditure (low x). Moreover, it
allows for commodities to be a necessary good at some levels of total expenditure and a luxury good at
other levels of total expenditure. To see this, consider the income elasticity for this model. In general,


















so commodity i is a luxury for a household with total expenditure level x if and only if βi+2 λi
b(p) lnx>0.
Therefore, a commodity can be a luxury at some levels of total expenditure and a necessity at other levels
of total expenditure.
The QUAID system is clearly nonlinear in parameters, since both the price index lnP(pt) and the
coeﬃcient on the quadratic expenditure term contain parameters. By replacing the parametric price
index with a Stone price index and by making the coeﬃcient on the quadratic expenditure term price-
independent, the system becomes linear in parameters. We will replace the parametric price index lnPt(p)
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∂ ln x +1 .
6Thus, we will use the following speciﬁcation of budget shares:
wiht = αi +
N X
j=1
e γij lnpjt + βi [lnxht − lnP∗(pt)] + γi [lnxht − lnP∗(pt)]
2 , (2)
i =1 ,...,N, h =1 ,....,H, t =1 ,....,Th. By linearizing the demand system in this way we lose two
features as compared to the original QUAID system. One feature is integrability: The system in (2) is
not integrable. We will return to this point later in this section. The other potential problem concerning
this linearisation is that it could introduce bias in estimates of price elasticities. Pashardes (1993) shows
that estimating an AID system (which is given as (1) without the quadratic expenditure term) with the
original price index replaced by a Stone price index may introduce bias in estimates of the price eﬀects.
However, this is not a problem for our analysis, since we are not interested in the price eﬀects; our focus
is on the income eﬀects.
We introduce unobserved heterogeneity (taste heterogeneity) into the model as an additive commodity
- and household speciﬁct e r m .L e tηih denote this commodity - and household speciﬁct e r mf o rc o m m o d i t y
i,h o u s e h o l dh, i =1 ,...,N, h =1 ,...,H. Then ηh =( η1h,.....,ηNh) is the vector of "taste parameters"
for household h, h =1 ,....,H and we have
wiht = αi + βi [lnxht − lnP∗(pt)] + γi [lnxht − lnP∗(pt)]
2 + ηih.
η =( η1,....,ηH) thus represents unobservable heterogeneity in consumers’ taste. We think of η as being
a random variable. The value of ηh is unknown to the researcher, but is known to household h for each
h =1 ,....,H.
As mentioned earlier, the imposition of linear Engel curves (as is the case when using the AID system
as in Calvet and Comon (2003) or the Linear Expenditure System as in Aasness, Bioern and Skjerpen
(1993)) can be problematic when testing for correlated heterogeneity. This is illustrated in Figure 1 (see
Appendix): Suppose we have two households, a richer one (with high log total expenditure) and a poorer
one (with low log total expenditure). Suppose that the data is like the points in the ﬁgure, that is, that
the richer household has great variability in total expenditure and the poorer one does not. It is clear that
in this case the true speciﬁcaion is quadratic in log total expenditure. Think for a moment about testing
for correlated heterogeneity by a Hausman test, that is, basically testing whether usual pooled OLS is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the within groups estimator 4. The pooled OLS estimator weighs all data
points equally and therefore results in a prediction like the one shown in the ﬁgure. The within groups
estimator uses diﬀerences from the mean in log total expenditure within households and thus gives more
weight to households with high variation in total expendtiures. Therefore the within groups estimator
results in a prediction like the one shown in the ﬁgure. Now, as a result of the linear speciﬁcation of the
Engel curves, OLS and Within groups seem very diﬀerent, when in fact, the only reason they are diﬀerent
is misspeciﬁcation. This is the main reason that we use the QUAID system as our base demand system.
4To be precise, in order to employ a Hausman test for correlated heterogeneity, one needs to estimate the model under
the null of no correlated heterogeneity eﬃciently, i.e. by a random eﬀects estimator. But since pooled OLS is consistent,
though not eﬃcient under the null, it suﬃces for our illustration here, since we only look at the estimators.
7We are now in a position to return to the subject of integrability. As mentioned, the QUAID system
given in (1) is integrable, and the linearized QUAID system in (2) is not. One could be under the
misperception that if we made our demand system nonlinear in parameters in the same way as (1) (i.e.
if we had added ηih + εiht to (1) instead of to (2)) then our system would be integrable. The point we
want to make here is that this is not enough to ensure integrability. What we have is that individual
demands are given as
αi + βi [lnxht − lnP∗(pt)] + δi [lnxht − lnP∗(pt)]
2 + ηih
a n di ti sk n o w nf r o mB Wa n dL e w b e lt h a ti no r d e rt om a k ead e m a n ds y s t e mw i t ha d d i t i v ee r r o r
terms (additive preference heterogeneity) integrable it is necessary that the error terms are functionally
dependent on prices and/or incomes, where functionally dependent means that the partial derivative of
the unobservable term with respect to prices and/or income must be nonzero. Another way to express
this necessity condition is that a minimum requirement for obtaining a demand system with preference
heterogeneity which is consistent with consumer theory is that there must be unobservable heterogeneity
in the marginal eﬀects. This condition means that simply adding a time invariant individual-speciﬁct e r m
representing preference heterogeneity to an integrable system does not again result in an integrable system.
How to formulate and identify a demand system with preference heterogeneity, where the preference
heterogeneity is functionally dependent on prices and/or on total expenditure - i.e. such that preference
heterogeneity can enter not just as a level eﬀect, but also in the marginal eﬀects - is still very much an
open research question. For one example of a demand system with lots of preference heterogeneity in
the marginal eﬀects, see Christensen (2005). Again, of course, that demand system is identiﬁed on panel
data, but not on cross sectional data.
To conclude this section, we compare our speciﬁcation of heterogeneity to that of Calvet & Comon
(2003). The reason we focus on Calvet and Comon (2003) is that ﬁrstly, they have formulated a model
with preference heterogeneity which is identiﬁed from repeated cross sections, and secondly, that their
empirical results are so dramamtic. Calvet & Comon (2003) introduce preference heterogeneity into the
budget share equations by applying Grandmont’s homothetic α-transformation to the AID system (see
Grandmont (1992), Grandmont (1987) and Calvet and Comon (2003)). The AID system is given by
wiht = αi +
N X
j=1
e γij lnpjt + βi [lnxht − lnP(pt)], (3)











e γjk lnpjtlnpkt,t =1 ,...,T.
Grandmont’s homothetic α-transformation of the budget share functions is given by
wh(p,x)=w(p,eτhx)
8for τh ∈ R. This yields budget share equations























Preference heterogeneity (unobserved individual taste-heterogeneity) is thus represented by the term
βiτh. The heterogeneity scheme in this model is related straightforward to the heterogeneity scheme
in our model: ηih = βiτh,i=1 ,....,N, h =1 ,...H. To establish identiﬁcation of this model, ﬁrst
sum the budget share equations over households for each commodity i. Because the heterogeneity term
τh has unconditonal mean zero, the term βiτh then cancels out, and what is left is the AID system
which is then identiﬁed oﬀ the time series of the repeated cross sections. From this, the βi’s can thus
be identiﬁed. Afterwards, sum the budget share equations over commodities for each h - because the
βi’s are identical across consumers for each i and because they sum to one across commodities, τh is
then identifed. The heterogeneity scheme speciﬁed in Calvet & Comon (2003) can be interpreted in the
following way: If βi > 0 then commodity i is a luxury, so τh > 0 implies that household h likes all
luxuries more than the average household and likes all necessities less than the average household. This
heterogeneity scheme thus allows only two diﬀerent kinds of taste: Either a household likes all luxuries
more than the average household (βi > 0), or a household likes all luxuries less than the average household
(βi < 0). Thus it restricts taste to have a common linear structure across commodities where the linear
structure is given by the directions of the income eﬀects for the commodities. A serious drawback of this
heterogeneity scheme is that for each household the random component capturing preference heterogeneity
is only one-dimensional: Beckert (2003) showsh that in order for a random demand model to generate
a non-degenerate distribution of demands, given prices and total expenditure, it is necessary that the
random variable capturing preference heterogeneity has at least the same dimension as the number of
commodities 5.
3D a t a
We select a sample of the ECPF consisting of the households where the husband is all the time employed as
a wage earner with a permanent job and the wife is out of the labor force. For a description of the ECPF,
see Chapter 2 in Christense (2005). We select the full-time employed wage earners with permanent jobs
because by only modelling the demand (and not modelling the labor supply) we have implicitly assumed
separability between the consumption of goods and the labor supply, and there seems to be empirical
evidence against this separability assumption: The empirical ﬁndings of Browning & Meghir (1991) show
rejections in the FES. By selecting out the unemployed, the part-time employed and the employed with
temporary jobs, we increase the probability that none of the husbands in our sample are making labor
5Lemma 1 in Beckert (2003).
9market descisions during the sample period. Obviously, by only selecting the households where the wife
is out of the labor force, we ensure that the wives are not making any labor market descisions during the
sample period 6. This selection makes the assumption of separability between consumption and labor
supply more plausible.
We expect the sample selection bias arising from this selection to be in the direction of less unobserved
heterogeneity, since we have selected a sample which is more homogenous than the original data set. This
will make a ﬁnding of correlated heterogeneity stronger: If we ﬁnd evidence of correlated heterogeneity
in this sample, we would expect to ﬁnd even stronger evidence in a more heterogeneous sample.
We do two more selections. We select out the households that report a zero budget share for the
commodity group food eaten at home (14 households). We also select out the households that report
earned household income to be zero (37 households). This leaves us with a sample of 3083 households
and 21.513 observations.
In our sample we have information on the occupational status and education level of the husband,
housing tenure, the number of people in diﬀerent age groups living in the household, the age of the
husband and the wife; we have expenditure information on seventeen diﬀerent non-durable commodity
groups and income information on several income categories. We will only use the income category
"Earned household income", which in our sample is the sum of the husband’s earnings and the potential
earnings of cohabiting adults (grown up children living at home and contributing to household income).
The reason for using this income category is that the expenditure information is at the household level,
so it seems reasonable also to consider income at the household level.
In the following we provide some summary statistics for our selected sample. Firstly, the distribution
of households according to number of quarters they stay in the survey:
N u m b e r o f i n t e r v i e w s 5678T o t a l
Number of households 574 482 465 1562 3083
Percent 18,62 15,63 15,08 50,66 100
These percentages are very similar to the analogue percentages for the full data set; thus it does not seem
to be the case that the households we selected stay longer or shorter in the survey than is the case for
the full data set.
We construct a dummy variable for the husband’s education level, which takes the value one if the
husband has a high education (where we deﬁne high education to be secondary school or a university
degree) and zero otherwise. We also construct a dummy for being a home owner, i.e. the dummy for
housing tenure takes the value one if the household is a home owner and zero otherwise. The following
table provides summary statistics for the husband’s education level, the husband’s occupational status
and the household’s housing tenure:
6The vast majority of the wives in the ECPf work as housewives and are thus out of the labor force, see Chapter 2 in
Christensen (2005).











Unspecialized workers 15,20 3.270
Total 100 21.513
Housing tenure
Home owner 78,13 16.808
Renter or other 21,87 4705
Total 100 21.513
Comparing these numbers to the numbers in the full data set, we ﬁnd that the percentage of home owners
is roughly the same: 78,13 percent are home owners in our sample and 80,87 percent are home owners
in the full data set. With respect to the husband’s education, there is a diﬀerence in that only 25,07
percent in the full data set have a high education level whereas 36,29 percent have high education in our
sample. This could reﬂect two things. One explanation is that we have selected out the unemployed, and
since there may be higher unemployment rates amongst the ones with lower education levels this could
explain the diﬀerence. Another explanation could be that since we have also selected out the retired, we
have selected out the oldest men, which have lower education levels than the younger men. The next
table shows sample means and standard deviations for the household composition:
Mean Std.dev.
Husband’s age 44,01 9,48
Wife’s age 41,92 9,62
Number of children 1,44 1,14
Number of adults 2,80 1,03
Total household size 4,23 1,24
Again comparing with full data set we get that the couples in our sample are on average younger than
the couples in the full data set (average age is 51 for men in the full data set and 48 for women) and that
household size in our sample on average is larger due to the number of children being larger (average
11number of children in the household is 1,05 in the full data set). But these diﬀerences were to be expected,
since one of the groups we have selected out is the group of retired households (which are older, and for
which the number of children in the household is lower). In summary, the only real diﬀerence our sample
and the full data set is that the husband’s education level in our sample is higher than in the full data
set 7.
N e x t ,w et u r nt ot h ec o m m o d i t i e sw ew a n tt oe x a m i n e . W ed e ﬁne ten commodity groups from the
non-durable commodity groups in the ECPF (see Chapter 2 for the full list of commodity groups recorded
in the ECPF):
Commodity Description
Food at home Food and non-alcoholic drinks eaten at home
Foodout Food eaten in restaurants, cafeterias and bars
Alcohol&Tobacco Alcoholic drinks and tobacco
Clothing Clothing and footwear
Transportation Transportation (excluding petrol)
Energy Energy at home (heating by electricity) and petrol
Services
Services at home (water, furniture repair),
Non-durables at home (cleaning products),
Personal services and Personal non-durables
Medication Non-durable medicines and medical services
Leisure Cinema, theatre, clubs for sports
Education Education
Sample averages and sample standard deviations of the budget shares are presented below:
7We also tabulated or summarized the demographic variables by the number of periods in the survey does not reveal
that any particular group should be more likely stay, say, longer in the survey than other groups. For example, one could
have expected that households with few children were more likely to complete the full 8 periods in the survey, but this does
not seem to be the case.
12Commodity Mean Std.Dev











A histogram of log deﬂated total expenditure for this selection of goods is shown in Appendix. As
expected, the distribution of log total expenditure is close to a normal. Since we will use within-household
diﬀerences in log deﬂated total expenditure to identify the income eﬀect, the variation in log deﬂated
total expenditure within the household is important for our analysis. We therefore examine this variation
more closely in the following. We calculate the standard deviation as well as the mean of log deﬂated
total expenditure within each household. The distribution of the ratio between the two, the coeﬃcient
of variation, is presented in the table below and a histogram of the values of this ratio is presented in
Appendix (both the table and the graph are based on 3083 numbers, one for each household):




.0093 .0147 .0194 .0210 .0255 .0370
Thus, there is on average a two percent variation in log deﬂated total expenditure within households in
this sample, which seems adequate. Next, we examine if the variation in log deﬂated total expenditure
within households correlates with the levels of log deﬂated total expenditure within households. To this
end, we regress the within-household variance in log deﬂated total expenditure on the within-household
mean in log deﬂated total expenditure. We also regress the within-household intertquartile range in log
deﬂated total expenditure on the within-household median in log deﬂated total expenditure in order to
control for outliers. The estimated coeﬃcients, with t-statistics in parantheses, are reported below and








quartile range on median
−.0275
(−3.63)
This shows that there is a small negative correlation between the within-household level of log deﬂated
total expenditure and the within-household variation of log deﬂated total expenditure: The higher the
level, the less is the variation. However, in the graphs of the predictions we also depicted the data points,
and the correlation does not seem to be crucial 8.
A histogram of log deﬂated earned household income is also presented in Appendix. Also the distri-
bution of log earned income is close to a normal, though not as close as log total expenditure is.
Finally, in order to compare the overall levels of total expenditure and household earnings in our
sample with the full data set, we report sample means (standard deviations in parantheses) together with
the corresponding ﬁgures for the full data set:
Our sample The full data set








This shows that our selected sample on average spend more than what is on average spent in the full data
set and that the households in our selected sample earn a higher income (though, the large diﬀerence
between the income ﬁgures for the two sample is somewhat misleading, since the ﬁgure for the full data
set is a sample mean and is thus based on all observations in the full data set, including the retired,
unemployed and self-employed which only contribute with zero earned income). This was also what
could be expected.
4 Empirical Analysis
Let wiht denote the budget share for commodity i for household h at time t,l e txht denote total expen-
diture for household h at time t,l e tpit denote the price of commodity i at time t and let pt denote the
vector of all prices at time t,l e tW1
ht denote the vector of demographics that vary across households and
within time, let W2
t denote the vector of time dummies and let uiht denote the unobservable term. The
8Moreover, the R2 of the regression of the variance on the mean is 0.01 and the R2 of the regression of the interquartile
range on the median is 0.0043, so not much of the variance (interquartile range) is explained by the mean (median).
14empirical speciﬁcation is then given by












wit lnpit,t = 1985,...,1997
and where
uiht = ηih + εiht,
where ηih denotes the time-invariant part of the unobservables and εiht denotes the idiosyncratic error






i]=σεiIT,i =1 ,...,N − 1
E[ηih
¯ ¯(lnxht,lnx2




where we allow for contemporaneous measurement error in total expenditures:
E[εiht
¯ ¯(lnxhs,lnx2
hs)] 6=0 ,t = s,
E[εiht
¯ ¯(lnxhs,lnx2
hs)] = 0,t 6= s,
h =1 ,....,H, i =1 ,...,N− 1.
The demographic variables in W1
ht are household size, the dummy for the husband’s education level,
the husband’s occupational status, the dummy for housing tenure as well as time dummies for which
"interview-week" the household is interviewed in. Because the survey design of the ECPF is such that
the interviews of the households are spread out across the year such that a given household is always
interview in the same week in each quarter (for example, if a household is interviewed in the second
week of the ﬁrst quarter, it is also interviewed in the second week of the other quarters), we have this
"interview-week" variable. In order to control for this systematic variation, we include these interview-
week dummies 9. Since there are 32 interview-weeks in each year, W1 =( W1
ht)
H,T
h,t=, thus consists of 36
demographic variables. W2 =( W2
t )T
t=1 is the vector of time dummies that are identical for all households.
We have chosen the most general speciﬁcation of seasonality and macroeconomics eﬀects and thus W2
9The "interview-week-dummies" are always signiﬁcant. In earlier speciﬁcations we also included age of the husband and
age of the wife in various functional forms, but these terms were never signiﬁcant, so we ﬁnally left them out.
15includes a dummy for quarter q, q =1 ,...,4, in year s, s = 1985,1986,.....,1997. B e c a u s ew eh a v e1 3
years of data with only one quarter of data in the last year, we have a total of 49 quarter-and-year
dummies. Because the prices recorded in the data set are quarterly price indeces and are identical for all
households, the quarter-and-year dummies are colinear with the prices, so we leave out the prices. Since
we are not interested in estimating price eﬀects, we thought it best to make the most general structure
to control for seasonal variation and macroeconomic eﬀects. The last thing is especially important, since
the ECPF is a rotating panel. This means that one household may be in the survey for, say, the years
1985 and 1986 while another household is in the survey for 1995 and the ﬁrst half of 1996. Obviously,
these two households will be exposed to very diﬀerent macroeconmic environments 10,w h i c hw ec o n t r o l
for by including the quarter-and-year dummies. Also, the quarter-and-year dummies control for seasonal
variation, that is, that expenditure patterns vary across seasons.
In this section we ﬁrst present our test for correlated heterogeneity. Secondly, we estimate the model
both by the usual estimation method employed on cross sectional data as well as by an instrumental
variables estimation and graph the marginal eﬀects in both cases. We test for whether there is a signiﬁcant
income eﬀect: For the commodities where we ﬁnd evidence of correlated heterogeneity, we perform the
test in the instrumental variables speciﬁcation and for the commodities where we ﬁnd no evidence of
correlated heterogeneity we perform the test in the usual cross sectional speciﬁcation. The left out good
is Education.
4.1 Empirical Strategy: Testing
The ﬁrst test that comes to mind when speaking about testing for correlated unobservable heterogeneity
is a Hausman test for random eﬀects versus ﬁxed eﬀects. However, the Hausman test is a test for whether
all the regressors are simultaneously correlated with the household-speciﬁc term. This means that in our
case we would be testing whether total expenditure, demographics and time dummies (and prices) are
jointly correlated with the household-speciﬁc term, which is not quite what we are interested in. One
could also argue that potential correlations between prices and tastes could exist and should be taken
account of (for example, some people may have a high taste for sales and other people not), but that
is not the focus of this paper. But even though we would ﬁnd evidence of correlated heterogeneity, it
would not specify what was the cause of this correlation; it could be that the correlation was driven
entirely by, say, correlation between household size and the household-speciﬁc term. This problem could
be overcome by employing the test described in Wooldridge (2002) pp. 290-291: If one is interested
in testing whether only one regressor is correlated with the household-speciﬁc term, one can employ a
t-statistic version of the Hausman test, using the estimated parameters under ﬁxed eﬀects and random
eﬀects, respectively, of this regressor together with appropriate standard errors from estimated variance-
covariance matrix resulting from the ﬁxed eﬀects and random eﬀects estimations. If one is interested in
testing for correlation with more than one regressor, one can use an F statistic version of the Hausman
test (this statistic turns out to be equivalent to the one suggested in Mundlak (1978) which consists
10In the years 1992-1994 Spain suﬀered a recession, while in the years 1985-1991 the Spanish economy was booming (M.
D. Collado (1998) p. 229).
16in including the within-means of the regressors in question). However, this test does not, as it stands
in Wooldridge (2002), allow for measurement error in total expenditure 11. Another drawback of the
Hausman test is that the estimator under the alternative uses within-household diﬀerences in the data
(most commonly the Hausman test uses the within groups estimator under the alternative, that is, one
of the estimators in the test is calculated on the basis of within-household diﬀerences from the within-
household mean). This means that doing a Hausman test would employ within-household diﬀerences of all
variables, also demographics and time dummies. Because there is only little variation within households
for most demographics this would entail losing a lot of information (quite simply, for many households
the contribution of demographic variables to the within groups estimator would be a number of zeros) 12.
For these reasons, we choose instead to view the problem as an endogeneity problem. Because we
have a panel data set, we have potential instruments in the case where endogeneity of total expenditure
is due to time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity: Diﬀerences in total expenditure and in income
will be uncorrelated with η. Hence we take an instrumental variables approach and carry out our test
for correlated heterogeneity between tastes and total expenditure as a classic test of endogeneity of
explanatory variables.
We will use an endogeneity test that utilizes the augmented regression (the reduced form) 13.T o
illustrate the idea, suppose for simplicity that the equation of interest is (the structural model)
yht = Xhtβ + uht,h =1 ,...,H, t =1 ,...,T,
We want to test if u is correlated with X and if so, we want to estimate β in a way that takes this
correlation into account. Suppose we have an instrument Z for X, then a way to test for correlation is
to do a residual augmented regression: First regress X on its instruments:
Xht = ΠZht + vht h =1 ,...,H, t =1 ,...,T
and calculate the residuals from this regression:
b eht = Xht − b ΠZht.
Second, regress y on X, including in addition the residuals b eht from the ﬁrst stage. The t-test of the
coeﬃcient on the residuals being zero is then a test of exogeneity of X : The coeﬃcient on the residuals
should be insigniﬁcant if X is exogenous, i.e. if u and X are uncorrelated.
4.2 Choice of Instruments
An instrumental variable is a variable which is uncorrel a t e dw i t ht h ee r r o rt e r mi nt h ee q u a t i o no fi n t e r e s t
(validity) and correlated with the endogenous variable in the equation of interest (relevance).I
11And it was not obvious how to adjust it to allow for measurement error.
12This also means that even if we could adjust the F statistic version of the Hausman test to allow for measurement
error, we would still face this problem.
13See Wooldridge (2002) p. 118-121 and Browning (2002).
174.2.1 Potential Instruments
The panel data provides us with time series observations of total expenditures and incomes for each
household. This provides us with potential instruments for the potential correlation between total ex-
penditure and the household-speciﬁc term, when this correlation is assumed to be constant over time.
Under the assumption that the correlation is time-invariant and that its variance is also constant over
time, diﬀerences in log total expenditure and in log income are uncorrelated with the household-speciﬁc
term. To show this, suppose that
Cov(lnxht,ηh)=ρ 6=0 .
Let ∆lnxht =l nxht − lnxht−τ,τ∈ {1,...T}. Then
Cov(∆lnxht,ηh)=E(∆lnxhtηh) − E(∆lnxht)E(ηh)
= E((lnxht − lnxht−τ)ηh) − E(lnxht − lnxht−τ)E(ηh)
= E(lnxhtηh) − E(lnxht−τηh) − E(lnxht)E(ηh)+E(lnxht−τ)E(ηh)
= Cov(lnxhtηh) − Cov(lnxht−τηh)
= ρ − ρ
=0 ,
i.e. the diﬀerence (for any time period) in log total expenditure is uncorrelated with the household-speciﬁc
term. Applying the same logic yields that lagged diﬀerences in log total expenditure (i.e. ∆lnxht−1 =
lnxht−1 − lnxht−τ−1) and diﬀerences in log income are both uncorrelated with the entire error term
uht = ηh + εht (assuming that the measurement error in the ε’s is uncorrelated over time within a
household).
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The set Z1 is a potential set of instruments in case there is no measurement error, but there is correlated
heterogeneity. The sets Z2 and Z3 are potential sets of instruments in case there is both correlated
heterogeneity and measurement error. The sets Z4 and Z5 are potential sets of instruments in case there
is no correlated heterogeneity, but there is measurement error. Whether any of these sets of instrumental
variables are valid is an empirical matter. We therefore now turn to empirically testing validity.
4.2.2 Validity of Instruments
When the number of instruments exceeds the number of endogenous variables, one can employ a Sargan
test for overidentifying restrictions to test for validity of the "extra" instruments. The Sargan test is a
test for whether the overidentifying restrictions implied by the extra moment restrictions hold; i.e. it
takes the moment restrictions needed in order to identify the model hold as given and then test whether
19the "extra" (i.e. the overidentifying) restrictions hold 14.
We carry out a Sargan test for each good separately, so in the following we suppress the commodity
index. The model is
wht = Xhtβ + υht,
υht = ηh + εht,t =1 ,....,Th,h =1 ,....,H,








E [υhtυks]=0 ,h 6= k, for all t,s.




















⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
≡ Ωh.
E [υυ0] is then a block-diagonal matrix of dimensions (
P
h Th) by (
P
h Th) with Ω1,...,ΩH in the diagonal.
Let Z =( Z1,...,Z H)0 denote the matrix of instrumental variables,
Zh =
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
z1





hTh ·· ·· zL
hTh
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
,
where L is the number of instruments plus the number of exogenous variables (i.e. the exogenous variables
are included in Z). The moment conditions implied by validity of the instruments Z are
E [Z0(η + ε)] = 0.















14Thus, the Sargan test is not a test for whether all the instruments are valid, but rather a test for whether the "extra"
















and b Ω is a White estimate of Ω. We thus calculate the Sargan test statistic in two steps. First, we get a










From this regression, we compute the residuals e = w−Xb β2SLS and use them to estimate Ω, as suggested
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⎦
With this estimate of Ω, we calculate b βGMM. Since households are independent, Ω is block-diagonal so






We always have two endogeneous variables (lnx and lnx2), so the number of degrees of freedom in
the χ2-distribution of the Sargan test statistic is always the number of instruments less 2. When taking
yearly diﬀerences rather than quarterly diﬀerences and when using lagged values, we lose observations.










Z1 6 3083 9181
Z2 6 2509 15.347
Z3 6 2509 6098
Z4 12 2509 6098
Z5 6 2509 18.430
The critical value of the χ2 distribution with 4 degrees of freedom is 9.488 at the 5% level and 13.277
at the 1% level. The critical value of the χ2 distribution with 10 degrees of freedom is 18.307 at the 5%
level and 23.209 at the 1% level. The critical value of the χ2 distribution with 1 degree of freedom is
3.841 at the 5% level and 6.635 at the 1% level. The estimated Sargan test statistics are shown in the
table below (bold numbers are signiﬁcant on a 5% signiﬁcance level, starred numbers signiﬁcant on a 1%
signiﬁcance level):
Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5
Food at home 6,622 485 10,045 (*) 34,664 50,487
Foodout 12,742 (*) 300 4,803 12,258 1,332
Alcohol&Tobacco 1,474 234 2,861 24,809 21,311
Clothing 27,580 263 3,150 16,932 10,697 (*)
Transportation 5,096 1256 7,886 45,168 56,360
Energy 11,866 266 1,051 5,934 13,402 (*)
Services 9,740 160 3,995 7,100 7,121
Medication 13,340 12538 10,425 (*) 14,295 7,596
Leisure 14,615 469 6,060 23,653 22,347
Education 12,814 (*) 12.317 3,833 10,641 4,087
This table shows that the only set of instruments that are valid at a 1% signiﬁcance level is Z3, which
consists of lagged yearly diﬀerence in log total expenditure and yearly diﬀerences in log income. The
results for the set Z2 are remarkable: Quarterly diﬀerences in log total expenditure and log total income
are very far indeed from being valid. The instrument sets that would be valid in case of correlated
heterogeneity and no measurement error, or in case of measurement error and no correlated heterogeneity
(Z1,Z 4 and Z5) are valid for some, but not for all commodities. We therefore continue our analysis using
only the instrument set Z3.
Because Z3 entails yearly diﬀerences and lagged values of yearly diﬀerences, where the lag is quarterly,
everything that follows is now based on the sample that is observed long enough to provide lagged yearly
diﬀerences. In other words, only households observed for 6,7 or 8 quarters can be used. This leaves us
with a sample of 2509 households and 6098 observations. We thus have between 1 and 3 quarters of
22observations per household left. More than 60 percent of the households that are left are observed for 3
quarters.
4.2.3 Relevance of Instruments
Since only one set of instruments turned out to be valid for all commodities, namely Z3, we only use that
set of instruments from now on. The reduced form (the agumented regression) is thus
lnx = π0
1 + Π1Z3 + κ1[W1 W2]0 + ν1
lnx2 = π0
2 + Π2Z3 + κ2[W1 W2]0 + ν2,
where Πj is a six by one vector, j =1 ,2. The instruments are indeed relevant in that they are signiﬁcantly





Equation where dependent variable is lnx 42,72 256,32
Equation where dependent variable is lnx2 8,31 49,86
We therefore carry on with the instrument set Z3. Whether there is enough independent variation in
the variables in Z3 to identify both the β and γ parameters of the demand equations is not evident from
this test of relevance, and thus Z3 may be a weak instrument in the sense that it only identiﬁes one of
t h et w op a r a m e t e r s .B u ts i n c ew ep e r f o r mo u re n d o g e neity test in an ordinary linear Two Stage Least
Squares estimation, weak instruments will bias the estimates towards the OLS estimates. This means
that if we have a weak instrument problem we are more likely not to be able to reject exogeneity 15.
4.3 Empirical Results
First we test for correlated heterogeneity by testing for exogeneity of total expenditure. We follow Banks,
Blundell and Lewbel (1997) and include only the residual from the ﬁr s te q u a t i o ni nt h er e d u c e df o r m .
This is exactly correct when log total expenditure and the error terms in the Engel curves are jointly
normal 16. As mentioned earlier in Section 3, log total expenditure is very close to being normal in
our sample. Denoting the residual for household h at time t by b eht, the estimating equation for the
endogeneity test thus is







t + b eht + viht,
15Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002).
16Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997) p. 530.
23i =1 ,....,N − 1,h=1 ,....,H and t =1 ,....,T and our endogeneity test is whether the residual is






Food at home -0.08 no bias
Foodout -2.14 downwards
Alcohol&Tobacco 2.28 upwards
Clothing 1.72 no bias
Transportation 2.39 upwards
Energy -2.00 downwards
Services -1.03 no bias
Medication -0.01 no bias
Leisure -1.36 no bias
From this we conclude that there is correlated heterogeneity in the commodities Foodout, Alcohol&Tobacco,
Transportation and Energy. For these four commodities, it is thus appropriate to estimate the budget
share equation by instrumental variables. For the remaining ﬁve commodities we estimate the budget
share equation in the usual way as if data was cross sectional; we estimate the budget shares by pooled
OLS, allowing for heteroskedasticity across households in these cases 17.
Next we examine whether there is a signiﬁcant income eﬀect. For Foodout, Alcohol&Tobacco, Trans-
portation and Energy we will test this with the IV estimates and for the remaining budget share equations
we test this in the GLS estimation. The table of the test results displays the F-ratio for the test of joint
signifcance of lnx and lnx2 18:
17One could argue that we should instrument for measurement error for these ﬁve commodities. But the possible instru-
ments in the case of measurement error (and no correlated heterogeneity) are represented by the instrument set Z5, which
is not valid. We therefore chose to use ordinary OLS.














Only for the commodities Transportation and Energy do we ﬁnd no evidence of a signiﬁcant income
eﬀect. That is, only for those two commodities can we conclude that "it is all heterogeneity". For all
the remaining commodities there is, even in the cases of the presence of correlated heterogeneity, still a
signifcant eﬀect from income.
In order to compare our results with other studies that have based their model on the AID system,
and also in order to do some sort of robustness check of our endogeneity test results in the QUAID
model, where we may have a weak instruments problem, we also did the exogeneity test and the test for
signifcance of income eﬀects in the AID model. The table of results is in Appendix. As can be seen,
there is no qualitative diﬀerence in the exogeneity test between the QUAID and the AID speciﬁcations:
In the AID model we ﬁnd evidence of correlated heterogeneity for exactly the same commodities as with
the QUAID speciﬁcation, and the bias is in the same direction. This makes us feel more conﬁdent in our













Finally, we present the estimated income repsonses (the estimates of the coeﬃcients in the total


















































































We are now ﬁnally able to present the two interesting sets of estimates of income elasticities: The
income elasticities estimates wihtout taking correlated heterogeneity into account (i.e. the demand system
is estimated by OLS), and the income elasticities estimated taking account of correlated heterogeneity
(i.e. the demand system is estimated by IV,using Z3 as instruments). The resulting income elasticity
estimates are presented below:
26Commodity group No heterogeneity (OLS) Correlated heterogeneity (IV)
Food at home .7031 .7087
Foodout 1.5571 1.8498







A sc a nb es e e nf r o mt h et a b l e ,t h ee s t i m a t e sa r es m a ller in magnitude in the model with no heterogenity
(OLS) for all the goods in which we found a downward bias, and reversely for the goods in which we
found upward bias. The estimates are quite diﬀerent in magnitude for exactly the goods in which there is
bias. This suggests that policy analysis involving demand for those goods could give misleading results.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have tested whether tastes are correlated with income, exploiting a unique panel data
set on household expenditures. Our results suggest that this is inded the case for some, but not all, of the
nondurable commodities usually considered in demand system analysis. Further, our results also suggest
that there is, even in the cases of correlated heterogeneity, still a signiﬁcant income eﬀect for the vast
majority of commodities. This means that our study supports what the few other studies of demand
systems on panel data have found, namely that there seems to be evidence of correlated heterogeneity,
which in turn introduces bias in estimates of income responses, but tastes and income are not completely
confounded as is suggested by Calvet and Comon (2003). The identifying assumption of the heterogeneity
scheme in Calvet and Comon (2003) could formally be tested with our data with a minimum chi square
test.
The condition of unobservables being independent of observables, among then income, is assumed
in all studies of nonparametric identiﬁcation of consumer demand models with preference heterogeneity
from cross sectional data. These ﬁndings suggest that this assumption is too strong, but also that it may
not need to be abandoned for all commodities.
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Food at home -0.09 -29.55
Foodout -2.15 5.61
Alcohol&Tobacco 2.27 -3.66
Clothing 1.75 16.76
Transportation 2.37 -0.60
Energy -2.03 -1.61
Services -1.00 3.09
Medication -0.04 4.90
Leisure -1.29 4.72
30